

The Speeches of Toshiki Kaifu: Arguing Ethos and Ethos as Argument

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In this paper I examine two speeches of Japanese Prime Minister Kaifu¹ with the purpose of interpreting those texts and explaining how they function rhetorically. Second, using that critical interpretation as a vehicle, I include some suggestions for a theoretical perspective which I think may inform Japanese prime ministerial oratory in general. The aim of this analysis in part then, is to identify some characteristics of this type of Japanese rhetoric which, should they prove useful in critical application, may further our understanding of Japanese rhetoric and suggest new ways of looking at it. My discussion of the theoretical approach suggests two characteristics that seem important: generic constraints—particularly with respect to the first speech—and the importance of ethos, or creating ethos as a primary strategy in both speeches. The importance of ethos was suggested firstly by the particular circumstances in which the speeches were given, and secondly by the characteristics of the position of prime minister in Japanese political culture.

The two texts examined may not necessarily be part of some future anthology entitled *Great Japanese Speeches of the Twentieth Century*. The first speech examined was Kaifu's first policy speech after being chosen as prime minister, in circumstances, as will be described below, that posed considerable rhetorical challenges. The second, to an American audience, ostensibly a ceremonial speech, was chosen as a comparative foil to the first, due to similarities in rhetorical strategies employed, which seem to

grow from the nature of premiership in Japan and the rhetorical exigencies in both speaking situations. On the surface they seem, like many Japanese political speeches, to offer little to entice the critic to engage them. Having said thus, however, the discourses do have unique characteristics which recommend them. The most noted of these is the popularity of Prime Minister Kaifu as a speaker in Japan. His skill, first recognized when he was in the oratorical society at Waseda University, was much touted in the media when he became prime minister in August 1989, and his quick rise in popularity is said to have been in no small part due to this skill.² His reputation is another good reason for looking at these speeches. However, in view of the goals mentioned above, I chose to examine them both as samples of Japanese prime ministerial discourse in general, and also as the rhetoric of an individual speaker, as the latter helps to sharpen the focus of the former.

Theoretical Perspective from Context

With volumes of rhetorical theory and critical methods at hand in the field one may be inclined to think that surely there must be a theoretical or methodological approach that would fit Kaifu's speeches. There may be, though I have yet to find it. I am inclined rather not to. Discourse within the United States is often not best interpreted by wholesale application of any one approach, and the cross-cultural nature of this analysis suggests even more caution in attempting to do so. Examination of the speech texts and the contexts in which they were given suggests a couple of different approaches which seem useful in explicating the discourses, though these necessarily will be adapted to the critical ends suggested by the texts themselves. These two approaches—a generic approach, drawn in particular from the genre of State of the Union addresses in the United States, and an approach which focuses on ethos³—help to sharpen the critical focus on

what seem the most significant aspects of the speeches. They do not explain all important aspects, and where they do not I have expanded, adapted, or added interpretations of my own to deal with the unique circumstances of the speeches.

The fact that the speeches are by a Japanese speaker and occur in two different cultures suggests also that—like all speeches—they will exhibit characteristics which are not explained neatly by any single critical approach. My approach is thus a hybrid of perspectives. Both approaches grow from a generic perspective, one more fully explicated via critical practice, hence with a view to criticism, and the other more addressed to theory. Because my aim is rhetorical criticism, I draw primarily on both toward that end, as guides for focusing criticism. Both these approaches are in a very real sense foreign to Kaifu's speeches. From a textual perspective they are not only external aberrations, but are literally foreign as well, i.e., non-Japanese. As such, both the State of the Union model and the function of ethos need to be adapted to the texts.

The three processes in State of the Union addresses described by Campbell and Jamieson seem in many respects applicable to the Japanese policy speech. The three processes are 1) public meditation on values, 2) assessments on information and issues, and 3) policy recommendation.⁴ The third process operating in Campbell and Jamieson's model—policy recommendation—would seem to be least emphasized in the Japanese policy speech. The prime minister is, unlike the US president, a member of the legislative branch of government and hence plays a continuing role in policy formation. Also, due to the factional nature of Japanese politics, where policy often is formed through a process of closed door meetings, committees, and consensus building, the prime minister is not likely to be able to do anything more than indicate general policy directions from the basis of general opinion in the government party.

While the specific content of speeches will vary in both Japan and the United States, these processes inform the overall rhetorical approach in both Japan and the US. Campbell and Jamieson note that in State of the Union speeches, presidents "also create and celebrate a national identity, tie together past, present, and future, and sustain the institution of the presidency."⁵ While there is no presidency in the Japanese political system, the term Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) could be substituted for "presidency" to the degree that it refers to self-survival of the institution represented by the speaker. The exigency of self-perpetuation, i.e., survival, can be seen to influence not only the policy speech, but, as might be expected, the choice of who can be prime minister as well, that is, who will be perceived as best able to represent the party.

The question of choice of prime minister, suggests the importance of the second approach to Kaifu's speeches which focuses on the importance of ethos. My use of ethos here is purposely broad, to refer both to the ethos of a speaker as it relates to his ability to present or enact audience expectations of a "prime minister" on the occasions that the speeches were given, and in a broader sense, the ethos Kaifu potentially enacts as a representative of the LDP and the Government to the Japanese people, and also as the representative of Japan when speaking abroad. Both levels of ethos—as individual and as representative of the Government and Japan in general—figure importantly in Kaifu's speeches.

The importance of ethos emerges when seen from the perspective of the purpose of the policy address as suggested above, and in view of the more specific situation at the time Kaifu gave the speech, specifically the tainted image of the LDP and the government in general which, left unrectified, represented a threat to the LDP's hold on power. The concept of ethos as examined by Rosenthal and the function ethos can serve in persuasion seem applicable here. Rosenthal notes the importance of looking at ethos when

"the personality of the speaker becomes the focal point of the reaction and the activation of the controlling value response is derived from that source, either directly or indirectly."⁶

Rosenthal develops the concept of ethos as it relates to the relationships between listeners and, respectively, speaker, environment, and message. Depending upon the greater exigencies in these relationships⁷ Rosenthal sees two types of communication: non-personal communication—primarily message based, and personal communication—primarily speaker (ethos) based. Rosenthal states that ethos refers to communication in which:

- 1) the persuasive effect is dominated by a value response activated by the personality of the speaker as opposed to the content of the message and
- 2) the perception of the personality is derived from and conveyed by the whole rhetoric—the invention, arrangement, style, and delivery—the "man speaking."⁸

Rosenthal uses as an example of personal persuasion a case of a political campaign in which two politicians' positions on specific issues are nearly the same. Determining whom to vote for in such a campaign becomes a question of personality as both candidates hold similar views. In such cases, ethos, or personal persuasion becomes more important than nonpersonal persuasion.

What this perspective seems to hold for my analysis of Kaifu's speeches derives primarily from its focus on the implicit persuasive strength derived from the perception of the speaker in the minds of the listeners. While this is not a new idea, it seems well suited to the analysis of Kaifu's speeches. Both the circumstances of the first speech in particular (the scandals plaguing the LDP) and the more general characteristics of Japanese politics and culture in general (the importance of ethos and appearances as opposed

to content) suggest this as an important focus.

The two perspectives were selected not because with them we can find a perfect critical fit. They represent approaches, when adapted to the unique circumstances of the speeches, which allow for a comparative analysis of the speech acts by viewing them from theoretical perspectives of currency in the United States, while at the same time allowing for enough flexibility to try, as far as possible, to see the speeches on their own terms. The State of the Union address as a model offers a general approach to the policy speech as a recurring form;⁹ the formality of the policy speech seems to warrant treatment which explains such exigencies as the form of the speech seems to suggest. The speaker (ethos) based perspective helps to explain the unique role of speaker, as both an individual and as a performer in the roles of symbolic and functioning head of state.

Though the theoretical approaches discussed suggest respective emphases on message and speaker, both speeches occur in a context, including the cultural, social, political circumstances in general and at specific moments in time. The contextual elements seem to suggest the approaches to the discourses discussed above. In that both speeches express a strong reaffirmation of ideals and tend to deal insignificantly or in only general terms with particular issues related to the specific circumstances, the primary exigencies in the rhetorical acts seem most clearly revealed from the perspective of message (and message form) and speaker(ethos, and speaker/message function). The focus on these elements does not ignore the importance of rhetorical context; rather, this focus grows from both the broader and more specific political circumstances surrounding the speeches, in particular the Japanese political context as this seems to best inform the rhetorical strategies.

Toshiki Kaifu, first elected to the Diet in 1960, was a member of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) that had ruled continuously in Japan since

1955. As Curtis suggests, survival is an important rhetorical exigence for the LDP: the party "has used all the resources at its command as Japan's only governing party to perpetuate its dominance."¹⁰

To determine how the LDP has managed to hold onto power for most of the post-war era is not within the scope of this study. That the party has, however, suggests that the party rhetoric has been effective at adapting to the political mainstream, and also, by extension, that identifying with or meditating on mainstream values and ideology will be an important element in public discourse.¹¹ This suggests that whether or not the LDP factions are united in policy positions or not, there will be an attempt publicly to appear so, and perhaps to a similar degree to imbibe a public discourse which equally presents a similar unity in the status quo, i.e., an image of a smooth running unified political machine that operates as the sum of its parts, which includes everyone from voter to prime minister.¹²

Despite the representation of unity, factional politics in the LDP suggest that such unity is symbolic (i.e., an expression of value), and that the role of prime minister is constrained, as we might expect, by the actual limits on power. After more than thirty-five years in power the number of factions had been reduced from more than ten to four primary factions. Stability of rule led to "the adoption of strict seniority rules to manage the recruitment of cabinet ministers and holders of high party office."¹³ Such rules suggest turn taking by power brokers more than they suggest selection of the best qualified for any given positions. This also suggests that the power of the prime minister will be relative to his factional strength, and also, because no single faction has control over government, the positions of cabinet members and prime minister will always be dependent on other factions for support. As Kishimoto states, "the distribution of cabinet positions becomes an exercise in balancing factional

interests to preserve party unity and harmony."¹⁴ The factional makeup of the LDP organization informs what we might expect of someone in the role of prime minister.

The review of the political landscape of Japan thus far suggests that real political power in Japan demands mediation skills and the ability to build consensus, which suggests not only communication skills but also having access to power via one's own faction or having the right factional connections, and knowing how to develop and maintain them. The fact that Toshiki Kaifu did not come from any of the main factions¹⁵ would thus seem to place more constraints on his power, and also suggests that in his case in particular the function of prime minister would be primarily a symbolic one, particularly with respect to his public discourse.

The constitution establishes the prime minister as the head of government; hence, we could expect the position to involve policy formation and introduction/recommendation of policy initiatives in the Diet. As noted above however, policy formation often seems dependent on vested factional interests. The fact that Kaifu did not directly represent a primary faction thus suggests that he would play a lesser legislative role, and rhetorically at least, play a more important symbolic one. This does not, however, seem a role that was necessarily unique to Prime Minister Kaifu alone. Rather, it seems an important function of the prime minister in Japan in general.

It is the importance of this symbolic function that helps to explain the seeming contradiction in the assessment of Kaifu as a popular leader who had very little real political power.¹⁶ What this suggests is that the legislative role of the prime minister and the symbolic role as head of state can be independent to a degree and, in terms of discourse, the symbolic role will be more central. We would expect then, that the circumstances of office as it exists in the Japanese political system place a high degree of constraint on prime ministerial rhetoric and, also, that rhetoric emanating

from the prime minister's office is on the whole not intended to affect policy in the deliberative sense.¹⁷ With this in mind, it also seems likely that the purpose of the Kaifu's policy speech, for example, may not be to indicate specifics concerning government policy nor to defend or argue for those policies to any significant degree. His purpose more likely grows from a need to generate a personification of the Government as a whole—to fulfill a symbolic role—to act as, or enact, the political ethos of the LDP.

A need for Kaifu to create a political ethos for the LDP becomes more evident when we look at the events surrounding his selection as prime minister. Most important in this context is what came to be known as the Recruit scandal.

The Recruit scandal involved the activities by the Recruit Company in which company officers made political contributions, gave gifts, and sold cut-rate stocks prior to public issue to various politicians and bureaucrats in return, allegedly, for special favors. With all four major factions playing roles in the Government, Weisman notes, "all major factions had joined the mainstream; hence few leaders were untainted by recruit."¹⁸ The scandal led to the resignation of Prime Minister Noboru Takeshita, and the designation of Sousuke Uno as the new prime minister in June, 1989. Though Uno had little party support, he was selected "after the party searched in vain for a leader who was unsullied by the Recruit scandal."¹⁹

While Uno had not been implicated in the Recruit scandal, his prior involvement with a geisha, whom he had purportedly paid about 2300 dollars a month for four months to be his mistress, became public. This brought down his government after the LDP was defeated in the Upper House elections in July.²⁰ Coupled with the Recruit scandal, the Uno geisha scandal "reinforced the view that the ruling party [was] out of touch with ordinary Japanese."²¹ The LDP thus was suffering from a severe image problem, and it needed a prime minister who could somehow clean up the

party image, in particular the image of the party associated with the major power brokers in the most powerful factions.

The LDP turned this time to Toshiki Kaifu, who, at 58, was a less well known, less experienced, and by standards of custom, a much younger prime minister, who also had little independent political strength. He had a reputation "as an articulate, affable, and 'clean' politician."²² In fact, it was Kaifu's clean image that seemed the primary reason he was selected.²³ Opinions floated about that Kaifu had been chosen as "a weak caretaker so that a Takeshita ally, Shintaro Abe, another faction leader, [could] become prime minister should Mr. Kaifu be forced to resign if the party [lost] the next general elections."²⁴ As the above passage suggests, Takeshita and the other faction leaders were largely responsible for the choice of Kaifu, and hence were also still in a position to dictate policy in varying degrees. In fact, based on the preceding analysis, since Kaifu was not a major factional leader, one would expect his power would be limited indeed.

The perception of Kaifu as weak, and of behind the scenes control by Takeshita in particular, was prevalent both in political circles and in the public's perception of Kaifu. "Not since Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka continued to dispense patronage and to dictate decisions after resigning in 1974, in the last big Japanese corruption scandal, has there been talk in Japan of such power wielded behind the scenes."²⁵ This was the perception both at the beginning of the Kaifu Cabinet, and throughout his tenure, despite a long period of sustained popular support for the Kaifu government.²⁶ Again, as noted earlier, this suggests a lack of a strong connection between perceived political strength and popular appeal and support.

The behind the scenes control argues that Kaifu would function largely as a spokesman, a symbolic head of state. The immediate circumstances leading up to Kaifu's selection as prime minister and the public perception of Kaifu's Government also suggest a need for who ever acts in that role to

establish and reinforce an ethos, not only for himself, but as the symbolic head of the Government, an ethos or image that will remove the taint of the scandals plaguing the LDP.

The analysis of context thus far has focused on the specific context of Japan, in particular with respect to the role of the prime minister and Kaifu's position in the political world of Japan. I have argued that the role is largely symbolic in many respects, especially as regards public discourse. The second speech, though given in the United States, presents further evidence of this role. This can be seen from the content of the speech—which focuses on the Mid-East crisis—which ignores or at least chooses not to deal specifically with other issues which were of importance to US—Japan relations at the time the speech was given.²⁷ What this suggests, again, as the analysis below will indicate, is the importance of Kaifu's discourse as a vehicle for enacting a persona not only of the LDP, but, by extension, of Japan in general. In fact, part of the purpose of the trip was to convince the US that "Japan is doing its fair share to help the multinational force in the Gulf."²⁸

Little has been said of specific audiences thus far. The symbolic function of Kaifu's discourse suggests a primary audience of the Japanese public in the first speech, and, in a different sense, in the second speech as well.²⁹ Though it is likely that few if any Japanese people would have heard or read the US speech, Kaifu's overseas performance as symbolic head of state would be closely watched in Japan. And, perhaps more importantly, similar constraints which are seen to affect the policy speech would also be expected to be evidenced in the second speech. As it is the function of ethos as a characteristic of Kaifu's discourse that is the focus of this analysis, and not audience effects, the audience of most importance is the Japanese audience, and this in respect to how it will inform or be informed by the discourse in general.

Textual Analysis

The policy speech of October 2nd, 1989 seems to fit the pattern suggested above via the State of the Union model. As noted in that discussion, the speech, though mentioning important issues, does not seem to aim at deliberative ends. The treatment of policy issues seems closest to the process of assessing information and issues.³⁰ While Kaifu treats legislative policy aims for the coming session of the Diet, his aims lack concrete specifics, and seem to be natural growths from his assessment of various issues. Meditation on values is evidenced throughout the speech, both as the basis for assessing information and issues (i.e., justifying his interpretation) and, in particular, as a means of establishing an ethos for Kaifu and, in the role of spokesman, for the LDP. Instilling confidence in the Kaifu led Government seems central in both speeches examined.

While the State of the Union model seems a useful guide for interpreting substantive content and treatment of topics in the first speech particularly, it seems the more general function of ethos, and the techniques which Kaifu utilizes to generate that ethos which serve best to explain both texts and at the same time to link them together.

By beginning his speech "Having been designated Prime Minister . . .," Kaifu projects a persona as national leader. Though undoubtedly everyone listening to the speech knows full well that he has been designated as the new prime minister, such phrasing seems to invoke the expectation or signal to the auditors that what follows will be spoken *as* prime minister. He further personalizes this image by expressing his resolve of "determination and energy in the face of the challenges of the 21st century," and the "gravity of my mission." The persona Kaifu projects is one of a determined, confident, public servant, reiterating throughout the speech such expressions as "I am determined," "I am resolved," "I intend," etc., while at the same time balancing this by placing himself in a position subordinate to the

will of the people. The frequent reference to his intention to listen to and respond to the people seems to be aimed at creating an ethos of himself as a trustworthy, hardworking, servant of the people, an ethos further reinforced by expressions of humility in the face of the great issues facing the government. He continues to add support to that ethos throughout the speech.

In the opening passages of the speech Kaifu introduces the theme of the importance of the "people," and begins to establish an image of himself which places him among the people, or at least as working for the people. Kaifu makes references to the "voters," the "Japanese," "listening to the people," etc., throughout the text. In addition to topical treatment of concerns dealing with the quality of life of Japanese people in general, the last one third of the speech is devoted almost entirely to such concerns. These elements of the speech seem aimed at establishing Kaifu as a leader in touch with the concerns of the people, i.e., an ethos of benevolent concern.

While the speech is organized topically, the treatment of each topic contains its own internal structure, essentially that of definition of problem—proposed response—future goals,³¹ with some variation in order of treatment. This structure and the treatment of the various issues seems designed to argue the primary thesis of the speech—that Kaifu's Government will or is responding to the concerns of the Japanese people (i.e., is doing the job of governing). The issues dealt with—restoring trust in politics, the consumption tax, administrative and fiscal reform, agricultural policy, quality of life, social and educational reform—are defined, or put into a context, followed by some sort of proposed response, and further explained with respect to goals or the ideals upon which such responses are based. While there are some variations, the overall structure is designed continually to repeat the message and create the image of a government

responding to and acting in the interests of the Japanese people. Evidence of this is provided primarily by example.

The first issues Kaifu treats in the speech concerns "restoring trust in politics" and political reform. Kaifu notes "the political process has become convoluted and the link between politics and the will of the people tenuous." Besides expressing his intention to return to "the founding principles of democracy,"³² he offers specific examples—his request that the Election System Council draw up reform plans, the various bills being discussed in the Diet concerning reform, and his desire to implement reforms by the coming "November's centennial of the Diet's establishment."³³ The direct and clear statement of the problem should work to further establish his ethos as a man of honesty.

It also seems strategic that Kaifu chose to treat "reform" in terms of politics in general, and not make specific reference to particular issues, political parties, or individuals, thus leaving an impersonal "politics" as the source of the problem. The indication of a specific deadline for implementing reforms also adds force to his statements of determination, particularly as the deadline he chooses happens to be a somewhat auspicious date, the sanctity of which must be honored, even more so since the issue concerns the Diet itself, i.e., implying a fresh start for the second century of the Diet. The focus in this, as in other statements on policy, is on the responsiveness to the will of the people.

His treatment of international issues, though of concern to Japanese people, and to a degree a necessary topic in the policy speech in contemporary Japan, also seems primarily to be structured to reinforce the image of Kaifu, to show Kaifu to be knowledgeable about international affairs, and to reaffirm political objectives of Japan as a member of the international community. In this section, as in others, Kaifu seeks not specific action, but acceptance and support of the Government, offering only judgments on the

wisdom of those policies by relating them to the concerns of the people.

In discussing the consumption tax, while Kaifu states that the Government has no intention of repealing it, he puts the issue in the context of the need for "equalizing the tax burden and to meet Japan's future needs."³⁴ Nevertheless, he again emphasizes the need to observe the effectiveness of the new tax in meeting the intended goals, and to "listen to the people and, with all due heed to consumer interests, to move ahead with the necessary reforms."³⁵ The statement follows his suggestion that the people were not adequately consulted when the original legislation was passed: "I frankly admit that our efforts to gain popular understanding of the significance of this tax reform and the need for the consumption tax have been inadequate,"³⁶ again asserting the responsiveness of his government, his own honesty, and his willingness (to a degree) to start anew. By framing the consumption tax issue in terms of a failure to gain "popular understanding" also diverts attention away from the policy itself.

In dealing with most policy issues, Kaifu offers little by way of specific policy suggestions. His arguments are structured less to promote specific policies or to demonstrate that specific policies will effectively deal with problems than to demonstrate that he is concerned about and is doing *something* about the issues he talks about, and that his approach to those problems will be based on the will of the people. Hence, while argument seems primarily by example, the examples offered say little in terms of specifics concerning policy. In discussing political reforms he names only such and such a council, and a few odd bills being discussed in the Diet; on administrative reform again he mentions the odd council and that they are deliberating; on agricultural policy he refers only to the spirit of the resolutions adopted in the Diet and the long standing position of maintaining self-sufficiency in rice production; internationally he talks of "enhancing our official development assistance," efforts to contribute "to the

success of the Uruguay Round," the September Tokyo Conference on Global Environment and Human Response toward Sustainable Development, and his visits with various world leaders.³⁷ In discussing issues of "fairness" and social revitalization, Kaifu again makes reference to examples of things being actively worked on but to few if any concrete specifics about policy aims outside ideological goals.

The treatment of these issues seems to grow from the exigencies of the occasion, i.e., a policy speech. In dealing with them Kaifu satisfies rhetorical needs that seem inherent in the situation. The way in which they are treated, however, seems to more specifically address the need of establishing his ethos, and by extension, the ethos of the Government.

There is a degree of flourish and color in Kaifu's treatment of issues, though on the whole it seems to be a restrained and formal style, not unlike his handling of organization. Following the topical structure described above, he proceeds to treat each topic almost formalistically, finishing one and moving on to another, with little or no transition, such that it seems that a number of topics could have been reordered without creating disunity in the text.

I have already discussed certain stylistic usages which seem aimed at promoting Kaifu as a leader responsive to the will of the people. While his many references to "listening to the people," "humility" in approaching issues, etc., reinforce that image, other usages seem to supplement that image with one of vigor, action, and strength, not only with respect to Kaifu himself but also to the policies of the government in general. He accomplishes this primarily through the use of figurative language, though seldom going so far as to create full fledged metaphor. In a "fluid" international situation, Kaifu is "toiling" for world peace;³⁸ he is "grappling"³⁹ with urgent issues, intends to implement measures "tailored"⁴⁰ for the socially disadvantaged, wants an agricultural policy that will "stand on its own two

feet,"⁴¹ intends to "flesh out and promote the Initiative's three pillars," and, to deal with the "road to the future barred by many problems," Kaifu intends to "mobilize experts."⁴² At negotiations, he will be "vigorous," "speaking out frankly, and saying what needs to be said."⁴³ While Kaifu does not expand much on his use of figurative language, the choices he makes to indicate action often have the connotation of physical strength, doing 'hands-on' work, which enhances his image as a leader involved personally with the labors of government, and as one who has the physical energy to do so, an image reinforced by his relative youth.

Before looking at some of the differing characteristics of the second speech, it seems important also to note evidence of the ideological orientation of Kaifu, as seen in his reaffirmation of values. This seems evident—and consistent—in both speeches examined. The most obvious statements of ideological beliefs can be seen in Kaifu's treatment of foreign policy. He begins this section of the Diet speech⁴⁴ by discussing the global context of East-West, in particular the changes taking place in Eastern Europe, which "demonstrate the values we have opted for—the values of freedom and democracy and the market economy." Within the global context he asserts the need for Japan to fulfill its role as a "responsible member of the international community." In addition to touching on these "shared values" (shared with other democratic nations), in the final section of the speech Kaifu expresses the need for "spiritual richness," which he identifies as concerning the importance of a healthy family environment (individual development and respect for others), equality between the sexes, care for the elderly, reiterating in conclusion "our basic philosophy of freedom and peace, and of democracy and respect for human rights,"⁴⁵ which he suggests can be realized in a society where members contribute and show care for others, drawing on the example of the Japanese Overseas Cooperation Volunteers as an illustration of the ideal.⁴⁶

This ideological perspective seems to work on two levels. First, as an appeal for Japanese people to think and believe as the stated ideology suggests they should, and second, to project an image of a leader—Kaifu—who holds the highest ideals and is eager to respond in whatever way he can to uphold those ideals for Japanese society as a whole (who presumably hold the same ideals). The ideological argument in this section is made particularly biting by Kaifu's introduction of this section of the speech with the most vivid example employed in the whole speech. In introducing the topic, he cites the kidnapping and murder of some young girls in the Tokyo area earlier that year, juxtaposing this against his statements concerning the need for society to be spiritually fulfilled.

In the speech given at New York University, Kaifu again emphasizes the ideals of "freedom and democracy," "values that our countries cherish," and again focuses on the need for nations to fulfill international responsibilities by referring to "international cooperation" and building a "new order to create a better world."⁴⁷ From an ideological perspective the New York University speech differs little from his Diet speech, save for the former speech's primary focus on 'universal values' and the absence of any discussion or reference to the spiritual richness theme, which seemed especially designed for the Japanese audience. The ideological bent, then, seems essentially one of emphasis on the ideals frequently tossed about in international rhetoric between and among the 'free' industrially advanced nations.

While the purpose of the NYU speech is not clearly stated, in that it is an acceptance speech on the occasion of receiving an honorary doctorate from NYU, and based on the content of the speech itself, Kaifu's implied purpose seems to be that of demonstrating himself as worthy of the honor (or perhaps better stated, to show himself to be not unworthy), by establishing himself as a leader abreast of and concerned with the

important issues facing the world community. A secondary purpose, which might be implicit in his role as the spokesman of Japan, would be that of projecting an image of a Japan as fulfilling its responsibilities as a member of that community.⁴⁸

The first two paragraphs of the speech serve as the introduction for Kaifu to establish a persona by invoking a sense of humility, conferring upon himself a subordinate position with respect to the university, with its "long and eminent history," and by reference to a former Japanese recipient of an honorary degree, former Prime Minister Eisaku Sato, "truly a distinguished leader in my country." In expressing his feeling that it is an honor to receive the degree from such a "fine school," and by referring to the degree and his receiving it as not so much for anything he has done personally, but as an representing "your appreciation of Japan and the Japanese," he places the credit for the degree not on himself but on the university itself and, secondarily, on the Japanese people. He thus again projects an ethos of humility, of a man with no need of ostentatious display. This would seem to ingratiate Kaifu's auditor's, which he further reinforces by referring to his being proud "to now call NYU my alma mater, and to be associated with the alumni of this fine school," having interpreted the honor as belonging not to him, but to the Japanese people as a whole. He thus accepts the honor both as an individual and also as the symbolic representative of Japan.

Following the introductory remarks, Kaifu turns attention to world affairs, describing the world as in the midst of "momentous changes," suggesting a sense of this being a moment of great importance in history. He further develops this, now switching from the "I" used in the introduction to "we," to include both himself and his audience in the momentous events to be discussed. He draws his listeners in by use of a familiar analogy: "We may be likened to sailors who are setting out on a voyage to

an unknown world, and rough waters may be ahead."⁴⁹ The simile suggests the Columbian voyage and, by extension, ideas of adventure, exploration, and progress, the new world, etc., albeit with a realistic qualification that "rough waters may lie ahead." Kaifu uses this metaphor to introduce his view of changes in the world—the end of East-West confrontation, the Soviet Union shifting toward democratic reforms, increased international cooperation—all of which suggest that we therefore "ought to hold great expectations for the future."⁵⁰ As an example of this, he notes the declaration of the G-7 countries meeting in Houston in which "We stated our determination to make the 1990s a decade in which the values of freedom and democracy . . . will spread throughout the world."⁵¹ Kaifu's treatment of world events tends to reinforce (and be reinforced by) the voyage metaphor, i.e., a striking out on a new beginning.

The voyage metaphor, with its associations for the American audience of the Columbus voyage, coupled with the use of the all inclusive "we" used in this section generates a semantic argument that Japan and the United States are members of the same community—not "you" and "me," just "we." The effect seems to be dissolution of any counter arguments which would focus on points of conflict between Japan and the United States. Such an argument, which ignores immediate issues, seems in line with the perspective of Kaifu acting as spokesman for the official line of the Japanese Government and, on an ideological level, as the voice of the Japanese people.

In the section that follows, Kaifu does address a specific issue—the Mid-East Crisis—specifically the actions of Iraq. Iraq has acted "in a manner to defeat this hope [for the future]."⁵² While part of this section can be seen as an attempt to justify Japan's policy concerning the Middle East, the argument is framed as an assessment of the situation based on the common ideology Kaifu has set forth in the earlier sections of the speech.

Iraq is presented as an obstacle to the "new order to create a better world," whose aggressive acts must be rejected. This treatment of Iraq's invasion of Kuwait seems less intended to muster support for specific policy, than to demonstrate Kaifu's allegiance to US positions and, subsequently (or by default, since of course the United States, from the US perspective, correctly interprets, and understands world politics, and thus has rational policy), demonstrate Kaifu's understanding of world politics, and project an image of a seasoned international leader.

Part of the way in which he seems to project this image is again by continual use of the inclusive "we" throughout this section, referring to everyone in attendance and presumably anyone else who holds the same opinions. The inclusion of the audience in the central portion of the speech, that is, Kaifu's speaking for everyone, projects a powerful second persona; in a sense, the use of "we" throughout seems to be an argument by default—i.e., if you don't consider yourself among the "we" to which I refer, then I don't consider you an auditor of this message.

The earlier identification by Kaifu of NYU as his alma mater seems to give him the opening to switch to the all inclusive "we." But this is further reinforced by the linguistic choices he makes in discussing the Middle East Crisis. Rather than merely retelling and offering his own opinions of the gulf crisis, Kaifu treats the issues related to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in terms of lessons learned. Assuming an audience of university faculty, administrators, and the university environment in general, this would seem to strengthen the bond Kaifu attempted to create between himself and the audience. Thus, Kaifu's interpretation of events becomes not those of an individual Japanese leader, but those of one who belongs to a plural "we" who have seen, studied, and now learned our lessons from these events.

The "sobering lessons" "we" have learned as a result of the gulf crisis are pointed out less to offer some new insight or a new interpretation of

those events than to create a context in which Kaifu can affirm a common ideology. Having discussed the Iraq-Kuwait crisis, he shifts to the positive gains which have come from these lessons, having brought together many different countries "under the one large roof of the United Nations,"⁵³ again intimating the sense that we all belong to this larger club.

In the two to three paragraphs where Kaifu speaks of Japan's actions in the gulf crisis, he uses "we" to refer to the Japanese government and people in general, but even here, Japan is first introduced via a third person reference, "Not only did Japan decide . . .,"⁵⁴ followed by a description of specific acts by Japan the wording of which would seem to demand an "I" or "we" referent. This latter section seems intended to emphasize the role that Japan is playing in the gulf—i.e., living up to its international responsibilities, taking on "their share of this responsibility, commensurate with their capabilities."⁵⁵ This argument is backed with specific examples of what Japan is doing and intends to do, e.g., monetary assistance, etc.⁵⁶

Kaifu's treatment of Japan serves also to reaffirm an ideology which holds peace sacred: "Japan has pledged never to become a military power again,"⁵⁷ and also the importance of the United Nations role in international peace-keeping activities. Via examples of the financial support Japan is giving to the allies, and via explication of Japan's constitution as disallowing any dispatch of military personnel outside Japan (and this is presented as being perceived as the best policy by other nations in East Asia), Kaifu argues that Japan is responding to the crisis "in the most appropriate way."⁵⁸

Near the end of the speech Kaifu does two things to tie his arguments and the speech together. First, he refers to the simile of the sailors setting out to sea which he introduced at the beginning of the speech, and, at the same time, he reiterates the ideals which were interwoven throughout the speech. Having treated many uncertainties in international affairs, he now

states "we need a compass to sail through rough waters in the dark." This compass, Kaifu states, is composed of "the principles of freedom, democracy, and market economies,"⁵⁹ thus tying together the earlier simile which suggested new worlds, exploration, etc., with ideals that are an important part of the US politic. Through this figure of speech Kaifu places himself and his audience back on the ideological ship he built in the earlier parts of the speech.

He further reinforces the ideological stance by referring via apposition to democracy and market economies as "the products of man's wisdom," and "Life, freedom, and the right to pursue happiness" as "the most important fundamentals behind these principles," and the need for these to be "preserved by all means,"⁶⁰ expressing the sentiment that these ideals transcend us. In his final remarks he again emphasizes the transcendental nature of ideals, arguing for the importance of ideals over individual glory, as he states his feeling that the honor of receiving the degree would be greater if it "represents your support of the convictions I have spoken of."⁶¹

Conclusion

The use of the State of the Union model seems useful for looking at policy speeches in Japan in so far as that model offers some insight into what we might expect from the policy speech in Japan. Contextual analysis suggested reasons why we could expect some similarities. An examination of more policy speeches would be useful to better understand the degree to which it might be applicable to Japan or, as is more likely, to use it as a starting point, based on similarities in speaker function, to create a generic model for Japanese prime minister policy speeches. The model does, however, seem to provide a useful starting point as it identifies processes which seem common to both the State of the Union and the Japanese policy speech.

"Conviction" might be a good metaphor to describe Kaifu's rhetorical strategy. Showing conviction, talking about the importance of conviction, or exhibiting the convictions which he holds supreme—a major focus in both speeches—seems to embody an argument that indeed he is a man of conviction. The set of convictions (values, ideological beliefs) he describes and sets out in both speeches make up the core of his rhetorical strategy; it seems a strategy in which creation of ethos is paramount and, depending on the degree of acceptance by the audience of the ethos thus created, the arguments suggested in the treatment of specific issues would seem to be expected to fall by the wayside. What this seems to suggest, essentially, is a rhetorical strategy which in a sense first argues ethos, and then uses that ethos as proof.

¹ Toshiki Kaifu, "Policy Speech," to the 116th Session of the National Diet October 2, 1989, reprinted in *Policy Speech Series 33*, Japan: Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The second speech was given at New York University on September 28th, 1990. A copy of the speech was obtained from the Japanese Consulate in Chicago, Illinois. I have used the official English language publications to quote in this analysis. The Japanese language version of Kaifu's first policy speech can be found at the data base: Tokyo Daigaku Touyoubunkakenkyuusho "Sekai to nihon" sengounihon seiji-kokusaikankei deitabeisu["Japan and the World" A data base on post-war Japanese politics and international relations], 1999
<<http://www.ioc.u-tokyo.ac.jp/~worldjpn/documents/texts/pm/19891002.SWJ.html>>.

² Kaifu Seiken Umarete Ichinen" [The first year of the Kaifu Government] *Asahi Shinbun*, 1990 Aug 5: 2. This contrasts with an earlier analysis of speeches by Noboru Takeshita, one of Kaifu's predecessors, who had a reputation as an ineffective speaker, whose oratory was perhaps most well known for its ambiguity. That earlier analysis was an attempt to discover rhetorical characteristics unique to Japan. This study more pragmatically attempts to focus on two speeches of Kaifu to demonstrate the applicability of ethos and genre in better understanding

Prime Minister Kaifu's oratory. Cf. D.L. Olson, "Beginning to Define a Japanese Rhetoric: Takeshita as a Japanese Rhetorician," Fukuoka Daigaku Jinbunronso, 22, no. 4, 1991, 1013-1033.

³ The genre of State of the Union addresses which forms the comparative basis of my analysis is from K.K. Campbell and K.H. Jamieson, "State of the Union Addresses," in Deeds Done in Words, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990, 62-75. The concept of ethos which I draw on is described in Paul L. Rosenthal, "The Concept of Ethos and the Structure of Persuasion," Speech Monographs, 33 (June) 1966, 114-126.

⁴ Campbell and Jamieson, 54.

⁵ Campbell and Jamieson, 54. There are, of course, many differences in the rhetorical situation of a Japanese prime minister and a US president which would argue against a critical fit. There are the most obvious differences in political positions—the president as representing the executive branch in the US, speaking to the Congress, and the prime minister as a member of the ruling party in Japan, speaking to fellow members of the Diet. There also seems a general difference in the treatment of past—present—future. Campbell and Jamieson describe the annual State of the Union as an occasion in which "using history skillfully, [presidents] can involve the Congress and the people in an affirmation that this is not only the way it was, but also the way it will be." The tremendous changes wrought in the Japanese political system over the last one hundred and fifty years—essentially going from a feudalistic society to a modern democratic one—makes suspect the degree to which "history" per se will be incorporated in speeches. Rather than history, we might expect an emphasis on tradition and traditional values. History does play an important role, particularly with respect to certain issues (e.g., the peace constitution). But, I would argue, the emphasis will be less on "what was and will be" and more on "what is and will be in the future," the past playing a role subsumed in the ideological meditations which are presented via "the way things are."

⁶ Rosenthal, 126.

⁷ Rosenthal treats these relationships as what he calls the communication configuration. My concern is only secondarily with these relationships. My primary concern is with Rosenthal's general view of how the rhetor (as ethos) can function as a primary source of persuasion.

⁸ Rosenthal, 120.

⁹ Which is not to say that I intend to clearly delineate a genre of Japanese policy speeches, only that the circumstances of the speech, the exigencies which grow from

the social/political circumstances of the speech suggest to me that the form will in fact recur.

¹⁰ Gerald L Curtis, The Way of Japanese Politics, New York: Columbia University Press, 1989, 45. Most of this review is drawn from Curtis. For a more legalistic review of Japanese political structure and functioning, see Koichi Kishimoto, Politics in Modern Japan, Tokyo: Japan Echo Inc, 1988. Despite the splintering of the LDP in the early 1990s, and a brief period in opposition from 1993-1994, this continuing hold on the reins of power suggests that, in addition to being able to mobilize a sufficient support base among voters, the LDP has been able to present itself to the public as the most legitimate party of government.

¹¹ Curtis notes a number of changes within the LDP which have come about due to both economic and social changes, and to the LDP's shifting power base. Many of these changes were brought about in the 1970s, which Curtis sees as a critical transition period for the LDP, during which it "completed its transformation into Japan's preeminent party of the broad political center." Curtis, 71.

¹² This suggests a substantial contrast to what we see in the United States in which diversity is seen and presented as strength. In the US this often seems stated as a "strength in unified diversity" theme. In Japan, and as seen in Kaifu's speeches, though there may be recognition of the individual, the message seems one of "strength in diversified unity" with an emphasis disproportionately on the latter.

¹³ Curtis, 86.

¹⁴ Kishimoto, 76.

¹⁵ Kaifu was at the time a member of the Komoto faction, formerly the Miki faction, the fifth largest, but considerably smaller than the top four.

¹⁶ "Kaifu Seiken Umarete Ichinen" [The first year of the Kaifu Government]. Contrast this with the assessments of former prime ministers Yasuhiro Nakasone and Takeshita. Nakasone was seen, though highly popular, as generally ineffective legislatively, and Takeshita, though being a weak performer in public, was considered a highly effective leader. See Daniel Sneider, "Japan's premier succeeds where others failed in tough political test," Christian Science Monitor, 1988 Nov 7: 7+.

¹⁷ While more than fifteen years has elapsed since Kaifu took up the prime minister's post, I would argue that little has changed either in the system itself or the rhetoric emanating from Japanese prime ministers. The current prime minister at the time of this writing, Junichiro Koizumi, has shown himself adept at adopting a more public relations style in dealing with the mass media, but I think the basic parameters and constraints on prime ministerial oratory have changed little in the

succeeding years.

- ¹⁸ Steven Weisman, "Trembling at the Top," New York Times, 1989, July 23, IV, 1: 1. A review of the various charges leveled against Recruit and various politicians can be seen in Steven Weisman, "What's New in Recruit Scandal? 15 Years in Court," New York Times, 1989, June, 29, I, 10:3. For a complete overview of this scandal, see Peter J. Herzog, Japan's Pseudo-Democracy, Kent, England: Japan Library, 1993, 175-187.
- ¹⁹ David E. Sanger, "Reports That New Premier Might Quit Plunge Tokyo into Crisis," New York Times, 1989 June 29, I, 1: 4. See also Steven Weisman, "Successor to Takeshita Chosen," New York Times, 1989 May 28, I, 3: 4.
- ²⁰ As the greatest political power resides in the Lower House of the Diet, losing the Upper House was not a loss of control over the Government, but was a major expression of discontent with the ruling party by the Japanese people. Uno resigned to take responsibility for the defeat.
- ²¹ Steve Weisman, "Trembling at the Top."
- ²² Steven Weisman, "Japan's Troubled Successor," New York Times, 1989, Aug 9, I, 1: 4.
- ²³ As noted by an Abe faction Diet member: "As Kaifu has not been involved with the special tax committee, and as his relations with Recruit Company have not received much treatment in the press, it was thought that he would not present a problem [as prime minister]." Nishimae Teruo and Nishii Yasuyuki, "Kaifu 'Odoriba' Seiken Tanjou," [The start of the Kaifu Government, 'On stage'] Asahi Journal, 18 August 1989, 14.
- ²⁴ Steven Weisman, "Tokyo Settles on a New Prime Minister," New York Times, 1989 Aug 6, I, 3: 4.
- ²⁵ Steven Weisman, "A Talk With Takeshita: Japan's Former Leader Denies He's Still in Charge," New York Times, 1990 Jan 17, A, 3: 1. Nakamura notes some interesting (coincidental?) parallels between the circumstances at the time and those of 1974, when Miki (Kaifu's mentor) was designated prime minister in the wake of the Lockheed Scandal. Nakamura Kenichiro, "Kaifu Seiken wa 'Kyutaisei Dapa' o Mezase" [Kaifu Government, aim for 'Smashing the old system'], Asahi Journal, 25 August 1989, 18-21.
- ²⁶ "Kaifu Seiken Umarete Ichinen" [The first year of the Kaifu Government].
- ²⁷ I refer here to the racial slurs made by the Japanese Justice Minister about three weeks before Kaifu gave the address at New York University that angered a number of civil rights groups in the U.S.

- ²⁸ T.R. Reid, "Japanese Premier Launches Media Blitz," Washington Post CAP ED, 29 Sept 1990, A, 19.
- ²⁹ This is intended in the sense that Kaifu, as the symbolic head of state, is expected (by the Japanese) to perform in a certain way.
- ³⁰ Refer to earlier discussion.
- ³¹ While this may seem rather like what conventional public speaking texts refer to a "need—plan—effects" structure, the issues treated do not all represent "need," and in some cases no plans are forthcoming. I have selected the terms which I feel allow for a certain degree of generic elasticity. For many of the issues dealt with, it might be more telling to describe the structure as that of contextualization of the issue—proposed response to the issue in context—and reaffirmation of ideals. The terms I have selected I think allow for such interpretation.
- ³² Kaifu, "Policy Speech," 4.
- ³³ Kaifu, "Policy Speech," 5.
- ³⁴ Kaifu, "Policy Speech," 6.
- ³⁵ Kaifu, "Policy Speech," 6-7.
- ³⁶ Kaifu, "Policy Speech," 6.
- ³⁷ Kaifu, "Policy Speech," 8-11.
- ³⁸ The phrase is repeated again on page 9.
- ³⁹ Kaifu, "Policy Speech," 4.
- ⁴⁰ Kaifu, "Policy Speech," 7.
- ⁴¹ Kaifu, "Policy Speech," 9.
- ⁴² Kaifu, "Policy Speech," 10.
- ⁴³ Kaifu, "Policy Speech," 12.
- ⁴⁴ Kaifu, "Policy Speech," 8-9.
- ⁴⁵ Kaifu, "Policy Speech," 17.
- ⁴⁶ Kaifu, "Policy Speech," 17-18.
- ⁴⁷ Kaifu, NYU Speech, 2.
- ⁴⁸ As noted above this does seem an explicit purpose of the US visit in general, though the more officially announced purpose was to attend special meetings at the United Nations. T.R. Reid, "Japanese Premier Launches Media Blitz."
- ⁴⁹ Kaifu, NYU Speech, 1.
- ⁵⁰ Kaifu, NYU Speech, 2.
- ⁵¹ Kaifu, NYU Speech, 2.
- ⁵² Kaifu, NYU Speech, 2.
- ⁵³ Kaifu, NYU Speech, 4.
- ⁵⁴ Kaifu, NYU Speech, 5.

⁵⁵ Kaifu, NYU Speech, 4.

⁵⁶ It should be noted though, that these examples serve at best as weak arguments. While they do say what Japan is doing, they do not address the issue comparatively, i.e., in terms which would give the audience some basis for concluding that indeed Japan is doing enough. The argument seems to hinge on the acceptance and credibility of the ethos Kaifu generates in the early portions of the address.

⁵⁷ Kaifu, NYU Speech, 5.

⁵⁸ Kaifu, NYU Speech, 5. This was quite obviously the expedient argument at the time, used to explain away the lack of political support for sending men and machine to face possible death and destruction. The later passage of the Peace Keeping Operations law, and the more recent dispatch of troops in the aftermath of the 2003 US led invasion of Iraq belies the validity of the constitutional argument.

⁵⁹ Kaifu, NYU Speech, 6.

⁶⁰ Kaifu, NYU Speech, 6.

⁶¹ Kaifu, NYU Speech, 6.